The EU’s proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been subject to considerable lobbying pressure. Attempts to weaken the GDPR have been attributed to the influence of powerful interest groups lobbying to profit from individuals’ personal data. In this paper we examine the lobbying patterns of a broad range of interest groups and assess the determinants of interest group support for the GDPR. What explains why some interest groups seek to weaken the GDPR while others support it? Using a novel dataset of interest group lobbying, we explain support as a function of (1) the fit between existing domestic rules and EU-rules, and (2) the potential increased costs facing specific interest groups working in specific economic sectors. Our analysis reveals that U.S.-based interest groups and financial firms (unlike IT firms) regardless of country of origin, face unique costs related to the GDPR and are incentivized to lobbying against the GDPR.
