Two decades after the principal-agent model entered the stage of EU-studies it becomes more and more difficult to identify principal(s) and agent(s) of EU foreign policy. This is especially true for European approaches to the resolution of violent conflicts. Confronted with various challenges posed by failed states, ongoing civil wars as well as conflict in the neighbourhood, the EU member states increasingly delegate mechanisms of Conflict Resolution to numerous agents. These instruments include a multitude of agent policies and are shaped by varying interests of the member states. EU Conflict Resolution measures range from funding and mediation to interregional arrangements and include military as well as civil measures. We apply a Principal-Agent (PA) approach in order to better understand cases of European engagement abroad. While there have been made substantial efforts in assessing EU-external policy from a PA perspective, additional research is necessary particularly with regard to the “A” in principal-agent relations. Extending the use of the model in our paper, we thus specifically focus on the question under which conditions and how agents are able to acquire more discretion independently of the principals. Investigating on post-peace-agreement periods in intra-state conflicts, we broaden the use of the PA model in EU-studies. Our findings suggest that specific motivations of the principals such as differences in the member states approach to conflict resolution, scepticism regarding external engagement as well as the rationale of enhancing agent institutions further on affect the leeway the agents enjoy. The complex policy environment of EU Conflict Resolution generates novel motivations for delegation in the EU context which shape the agent’s room for manoeuvre. In addition, our findings indicate that in some cases contestation between and in-between principals and agents of EU conflict resolution has an important influence on agent discretion.
