Member states often outsource functions to the EU institutions, because they anticipate that the EU institutions can carry out these functions better and/or cheaper. Specialization is thus at the heart of the principal-agent model. Delegation to the European External Action Service, by contrast, often has a non-exclusive character. While the member states have delegated various foreign policy tasks to the High Representative and the EEAS, they may continue to carry out the very same tasks themselves. The paper argues that the exclusivity of delegation coupled with the precision of the delegation contract are necessary conditions for the principal-agent model to be applicable. It draws on two empirical illustrations. The first concerns the exclusively EEAS-led Facilitated Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo (2011-13). This involved traditional principal-agent problems such as agent selection, goal conflicts and informational asymmetries. The second illustration is about the non-exclusive mandate to provide representation through the EU delegations in third states. This involved problems such as competition for access which are better captured by other theories. In conclusion, the paper finds that the principal-agent model is insightful in specific instances where the EEAS has been given an exclusive mandate on behalf of the membership
