Does the Principal-Agent model contribute to any of the important normative questions that haunt EU decision-making and does it still retain this quality in an increasingly complex empirical reality? Existing applications of the model have often neglected a thorough discussion of its normative underpinnings. In this paper we address this ail by explicating the model’s reliance on an assumption of moral superiority of the principal vis-à-vis the agent. Hierarchical control thus functions as the main mechanism to ensure accountability. We thus trace the model’s societal relevance in the chain of delegation that links the voter as the ultimate principal with the European institutions that often act as the ultimate agent. Drawing on examples from a wider range of EU decision-making processes, we then proceed to question the empirical validity of these assumptions in a more complex empirical reality. We conclude by pointing at the limitations of the PA-model as a source of legitimacy and suggest that alternative mechanisms of accountability need to be considered to make the EU democratically legitimate in the current institutional context.
