Throughout the Eurozone crisis, decision-makers and observers called upon Germany to exert political leadership. Yet, Germany has not emerged as the hoped-for leader. According to the issue at stake, we rather observe three different outcomes: Firstly, Germany simply refrained from leadership; secondly, Germany assumed leadership, but failed in delivering; thirdly, Germany acted as a successful leader. The paper examines the reasons for this variance. Therefore, it will qualitatively analyse and compare three cases on each outcome: the first financial assistance granted to Greece in 2010, the failed attempt to make Olli Rehn a ‘super-commissioner’, and finally Germany’s role in successfully shaping the Fiscal Compact. The empirical analysis is based on original data, gathered through 20 semi-structured élite interviews in Brussels and Berlin. Theoretically, the paper argues that the variance in Germany’s behaviour can be explained by employing a rational institutionalist model of political leadership. Thus, Germany’s emergence as a leader depends on the expected costs and benefits of leading as well as on the status quo costs of its potential followers. Its impact, instead, depends on three factors: power, institutional constraints, and the distribution of preferences among the actors involved. Hence, the paper shows that the institutional and policy outcomes of the EU crisis management are also a result of Germany’s (un)willingness to take up leadership. These conclusions are therefore consistent with the work of those scholars who assert that the design of EMU depends to a great extent on the agency of Germany as the Eurozone’s most powerful actor.
