There has certainly been much written on democracy in Europe. But in light of multiple pending challenges to European integration, the issue of the EU’s democratic quality could hardly be more relevant than now. Though by no means the only factor, a great deal of critique toward the EU stems from its democratic dilemma, entailing e.g. limited possibilities for citizen influence or a lack of mechanisms for making EU decision-makers representative of or accountable to the European electorate. This dilemma poses all the more so a burden for legitimacy of governing in the EU due to its development in the course of European integration to a polity-like entity with far-reaching political powers. Despite the wealth of research and debate on democratizing the EU, one approach continues to be widely neglected, namely the direct election of the Commission President. This appears particularly surprising for a number of reasons, not least of which – as the paper sets out to demonstrate – given the affinity of the EU ‘government’ to a complex separation of powers systems.
Consequently, it is all the more crucial to re-examine the EU system of government in order to reach a better understanding of the political system evolved at EU level. Indeed, gaining more analytical certainty about the supposedly sui generis system can allow for grasping and comparing the institutional-structural arrangement the EU has developed, which should be reason enough. But it may also provide orientation when actually considering suitable reform options, going beyond a one-sided focus on parliamentarianism that would make the Commission responsible to the European Parliament.
