Antitrust rules are fundamentally informed and shaped by economic theories. Given the significance of EU competition policy for the European integration process, it is essential to disentangle the economic theories underlying EU competition law. There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature examining the influence of ordoliberalism on EC/EU competition policy. However, a growing body of literature has recently emerged to disprove the fact that ordoliberalism has ever influenced this policy area. Furthermore, in recent years, ordoliberal principles appear to have been replaced by neoliberalism and efficiency-enhancing rationale in EU competition policy. This article puts forward the idea of turning to the Chicago School theory in order to ascertain whether it is able to offer any analytical leverage to putting at least some of the pieces of the antitrust puzzle together by means of clarifying whether the Commission incorporates the Chicago School theory into EU competition law provisions. The analysis is carried out on the basis of the Commission’s guidelines, notices, and block exemption regulations where the Commission presents the analytical approach used in its appraisal of business practices.
