There are numerous philosophers, from Geoffrey A. Cohen to Russ Shafer-Landau, who argue that Kantian constructivism projects rely upon foundations with unconstructed elements, which in fact means that they cannot be a complete construction, and therefore not really constructivist at all (or at least ‘constructivist all the way down’). Those defending Kantian constructivism against this sort of objection tend to acknowledge the presence of the unconstructed elements (be they a substantive conception of human rationality, or moral intuitions in general), but deny any significant part they might have in the construction process. In my paper, I argue that whilst this may be true, Kant correctly thought that metaphysical commitments had to be made in order to ascribe any normative significance to the construction. Whilst constructivists correctly cite the formal methodology for determining the rightness of actions, they ignore this metaphysical commitment to their detriment.
Keywords
Constructivism, Political Theory, Moral Realism
