The Morality Club and the Moral Sceptic: A Defence of 'Dialogical Kantian Constitutivism'

Kantian constitutivism is a promising approach to moral justication. Starting from concepts like agency, practical deliberation, moral discourse or dialog, it promises to do without speculative ontological assumptions; vindicating moral judgments by means of transcendental reasoning it seems capable to account for the normative force of these judgments. However, »monological« versions of Kantian constitutivism , face serious problems regarding the validity of the justification as well as the content of their moral theory I will therefore defend »Dialogical Kantian Constitutivism«, a specific version of Kantian Constitutivism that draws on but also significantly differs from ideas that have been developed in the tradition of discourse ethics as well as by Stephen Darwall.The main amendment I will try to make to the latter approaches is a clarification of the sense in which acceptance of moral obligations can be thought as »inevitable« in »dialogical« versions of Kantian Constitutivism.