The European Union (EU) is set to promote a specific approach to good governance conditionality as a standard of behaviour in international development, which the European Commission claims to be distinctively 'European'. However, as a policy norm it remains highly contested within and outside the EU. The Commission seems unable to overcome internal institutional capacity constraints and diverging interests and identities to promote good governance based on 'common' EU norms. This paper assesses how governance conditionality has been constructed within the EU and how it is related to the EU’s distinctive normative foundation. Building on evidence from the European Commission's Governance Incentive Tranche (ECGIT) between 2008 and 2013, this analysis offers insights into the competing rationales resulting from diverging policy norms, which buttress the Commission's promotion of good governance through conditionality. It is argued that the Commission's approach is partly based on its balancing of competing norms, especially the idea of a distinctive 'European' approach and effective multilateral cooperation.
