ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Decentralisation in Africa: Sequences and Political Incentives

James Tyler Dickovick
Washington and Lee University
James Tyler Dickovick
Washington and Lee University

Abstract

This paper examines African decentralization through the lens of historical-institutionalism, with emphasis on the extent to which decentralization sequences shape the extent of autonomy for sub-national governments in multi-level systems (both federal and unitary). The paper begins by noting several challenges to sequential arguments about decentralization to Africa. A key issue is endogeneity and complexity in terms of how decentralization is periodized across its political, fiscal, and administrative dimensions. To provide a closer fit between sequential theory and African realities, the paper then highlights new variables that must complement time and sequence. Looking at decentralization processes that are open-ended and ongoing across various dimensions leads to a modified sequential argument that combines changes over time with key comparative-static variables: the dynamics of political party systems and the ways these party system dynamics shape the incentives of decentralizers.