I will argue in three steps that an entitlement to citizenship has, in fact, always been a Kantian idea: Firstly, citizenship is a postulate of practical reason. Secondly, this postulate can be explained by Kant’s differentiation between ius materialiter and ius formaliter. Materially, every right entitles me to some action or thing. Formally, however, I can only exercise these entitlements if this does not contradict the “conditions of the reciprocal will”. The latter refers to “the conditions under which alone everyone is able to enjoy his rights […] in accordance with the idea of a will giving laws for everyone” (6:305f.), i.e. a rightful condition. Consequently, statehood is the necessary condition to legitimately claim material rights. This also applies, thirdly, to Kant’s “one innate right”. Since I can claim my innate right only within a rightful condition, this human right already implies a right to citizenship.
