I argue in three steps that Kant’s concept of right in the 'Rechtslehre' does not allow for a foundation in human dignity.
Firstly, I argue that anyone who embraces human rights has reason to accept the “Externality Thesis,” which says that juridical laws only describe the limits of the use of “external” freedom and cannot and should not prescribe motivations.
Secondly, I argue that if we accept the Externality Thesis, juridical laws can only be valid if there is an analytic connection between right and coercion.
Thirdly, I argue that the Categorical Imperative does not allow for a justification of the type of coercion that is entailed by Kant’s concept of right, and that therefore human dignity cannot be the basis of human rights. To end on a positive note, I suggest that a political justification of legal coercion is possible even if a moral justification is lacking.
