Scholarship claims that asymmetrical mechanisms influence the development of territorial dynamics in multinational federal agreements. Nationality-based units (NBUs) and regional-based units (RBUs) question with “nested games” (Tsebilis 1990) the federal stability. By bridging game-theoretic and historical perspective this paper analyzes if the rational-choice approach in form of the baseline theory of asymmetrical federalism in multinational states (Zuber 2011) rightly puts the “upgrade game” played by the regions as the crucial “incentive” of territorial dynamics. After applying this model to the Spanish “State of Autonomies” the author finds out, that even if the “nested multinational game” have some influence on the federal dynamics, the institutional design has been more significant. The author develops an improved model, which shows that statewide parties (SWP) and regional parties (NSWP) are the main players. This model also shows that the central state uses the “upgrade” ambitions of the regions to achieve a dynamic of resymmetrization.
