Abstract:
Following the outbreak of the economic crisis, there has been much attention towards the politicization of European Union-related issues - especially in connection to the so-called “democratic deficit” issue. Clearly, this entails also the role of National Parliaments, as bodies apt to handle the "intermestic" character of the crisis. This work focuses on the Italian parliament – regarded as a “typical case” – whose investigation may advance also comparative research. The empirical analysis performed refers to claims-making analysis and focuses on the analysis of plenary debates on the “Economic and Financial Document” issued following the enactment of the “European Semester”(2011/2013). Those programmatic documents indicate the executive’s position, as discussed by the parliament based on the equilibrium that has been created by partisan and societal interests. The main findings suggest a renovated interest towards "Europe" on behalf of parliamentarians. Last, the importance of the national parliament as veto-player is underlined.
