Classic approaches to accountability tend to ask “by whom” accountability is exerted: Accountability by courts is called “legal”, accountability by governments “political accountability”. From the viewpoint of the present framework, it is more promising to ask the “for what” question: For which aspect of its conduct an agency is hold to account by a certain accountability regime (Bovens, 2007)? “Political accountability” refers to statutory goals and instruments, “operational accountability” regards single regulatory decisions, while “managerial accountability” has to do with the efficiency of budget and staff use (Biela and Papadopoulos, forthcoming). Between these levels, accountability structures regularly differ empirically, while a lack of accountability has a different normative meaning. In particular, the omnipresent notion of agency ‘independence’ mostly refers to the absence of operational accountability vis-à-vis democratically elected actors.
Second, rather than just analyzing de jure accountability, the paper focuses also on the de facto use of accountability instruments:
• Can fora process the information they get or do they suffer from severe shortcomings of factors such as expertise, or time?
• Can fora effectively use their rights to draw consequences, or are they hampered by e.g. unanimity requirements, heterogeneous composition, or high side costs?
• Can coordination practices between fora effectively reduce or remedy deficits of the accountability regime?
Using document analysis and semi-structured interviews, the relations between regulatory agencies and their accountability fora are scrutinized in four countries (Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Ireland) and two policy areas (Telecommunications, and Finance).
The empirical results indicate that operational accountability towards elected actors in general is quite weak in the case of IRAs. However, there are weaknesses at other levels as well. These can be associated with weaknesses in formal rights, limited resources and hence weak information capabilities, but also with high side costs for fora in case of sanctioning decisions.
