The paper addresses the topic of crisis accountability and the effects on ministerial careers. The central question is why some ministers survive post crises blame games whereas others do not. Ministers seen as compromised by a crisis or its management can be undermined, lose public and parliamentary support and be called on to resign (Woodhouse, 2004; Bovens et al., 2010; Dowding and Lewis, 2012; Fischer, 2012; Bäck et al. 2012). The paper stands on the brink of individual political skills and capacities and the institutional or judicial constraints that leaders encounter.
The paper combines theories of blame management (cf. Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Boin et al, 2009, 2010; Hood, 2011; Masters and t’Hart, 2012) and accountability management (c.f. Dowding and Kang, 1998; Woodhouse, 2004; Bovens et al., forthcoming). We will contrast the two logics of explanation: ministerial tenure as a consequence of constitutional cabinet factors and individual political experience, political capital and; political resignations as a result of a meaning making processes beyond government.
We will employ a comparative case-study design of national crises events in the Netherlands. Cases will be selected applying four steps: have occurred within a contemporary era of politics; be well documented; the overall sample will contain sufficient variation in the dependent variable (resignations or not); and they will have to been viewed as national crises events in the public domain.
Cases under consideration are for example; Srebrenica massacre (1995), the Schiphol detention fire (2005) and the IRT affair (1993). Given that the Netherlands is a consensus-based democracy findings could potentially be comparable within a wider setting, and the results of the research can contribute to a profile of leadership capital in the Netherlands.
