The aftermath of the economic crisis in Iceland brought an even deeper political crisis. Demands were made for increased participation of the public in decision making, either through referendums or a restructuring of the political system. Trust towards politicians and political institutions is at an all-time low and the last General elections exposed a fragmented political system. Recognising the need for a public discussion about the 'values of the nation' the government decided in 2009 to start the process of rewriting the constitution, through a popularly elected Constitutional Council.
Despite the apparent public nature of the venture and a referendum that indicated popular support for the Council’s proposal, a new constitution has not been passed. This paper will examine several reasons for why this might be the case, such as opposition from political and academic elites, the interest (or lack thereof) of the public, and the somewhat confrontational rhetoric used by those in favour of a new constitution.
Using data from both the The Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES) and preliminary data from semi-structured qualitative interviews with several people involved in the constitutional process, this paper will explain how deliberative democratic mechanisms can simultaneously be seen as increasing and decreasing democracy. The paper will also explore the nature of a social movement in Iceland calling for constitutional reform.
The theoretical background of the paper follows the work of Stanley N. Katz in by exploring the triangular relationship between constitutionalism, civil society, and democracy. The underlying question is how the three interplay and affect one another through relationships between different actors in society.
The author is pursuing a PhD in political science at the University of Iceland. He is also a researcher in the CoPolis project, on constitutional politics in Europe, hosted by the University of Trento, Italy.
