The Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) constitutes a very rich and exiting example for judicial politics. Ethnopolitical actors used the procedure of abstract review of constitutionality to demand the Court to rule on questions of fundamental importance to Bosnia’s constituent nations, such as the constitutions of sub-states, their symbols, holidays, name of the villages, the status of churches, the return of refugees, the status of constituent nations and minorities on their territory etc. In the words of Anna Mansfield, the success or failure of the Court to implement the rule of law will determine whether BiH will achieve peace and stability.
In view of the gridlock of the Bosnian political and judicial system, international judges, making up one third of the Constitutional Court’s composition, were the central players in these decisions. According to the Constitution of BiH, the competence to decide upon these nominations is entrusted to the President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). First, this contribution will study the reasons behind the selection of international judges. Second, it will analyze whether the nominations of the President of the ECtHR changed over time. Third, it will enquire upon the reasons for judicial turnover and the influence on the work of the Court; judge David Feldman’s resignation being a point in case.
Overall, this contribution draws from precedent work of the author on constitutional jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Kosovo in relation to multiculturalism (and the crucial influence of international judges in these decisions). This study is made possible owing to the network of the author’s PhD supervisor Josef Marko, who has been Vice-President of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and a member of the Venice Commission. Prof. Marko is also willing to actively contribute to the research and writing of this paper
