In this paper we are concerned with judicial tenures and removals in the highest courts of six new, developing democracies, three of them in Africa (Benin, Madagascar, Senegal) and three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay). The scholarly literature has pointed out that the rules for tenure and removal are of paramount importance for producing judicial insulation. The general argument states that the more actors involved in these formal processes, the more likely it is that judges will be able to decide in an autonomous way; similarly, relatively long or even life-long tenures should be producing the same effects. Although there is a great cross-country variation in terms of how these rules are defined, this variation is even larger when we analyse whether such rules are complied with in practice or not.
This paper studies empirically to what extent judges leave the bench due to the regular application of the legal rules (e.g. end of limited terms, natural death) or because of other irregular, potentially politically motivated, factors (e.g. non-reappointment, impeachment, early retirement, unnatural death). The paper builds upon a dataset of all judges serving in these countries since the democratic transitions (143 appointed judges; of which 97 have finished their terms). Original data collected in extensive interviewing helps with the assessment of individual cases. Regarding explanatory factors, two seem to be playing a major role: on the one hand, the relation to the elected political actors or, similarly, the impact of changes in the constellation of political power, and, on the other, the effect of the judge’s individual behaviour. The paper contributes new evidence on the barely studied African cases, provides a wide comparative perspective on modes of departure, and sheds light on the effects of different political circumstances on the frequency and types of irregular departures.
