Social Network Analysis (SNA) has been recently applied to study the mobilization, coalitions building and policy impacts of interest groups (IGs). Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2013) analyze the impacts of amicus curiae briefs filled by IGs in US Supreme Court cases from 1946 to 2001. Heaney & Lorenz (2013) develop the concept of "coalition portfolio" to grasp the influence of IGs on the formulation and implementation of the US healthcare policy. Bowler & Hanneman (2006) use the SNA methodology to investigate IGs' financial contributions to 48 California ballot campaigns organized between 2000 and 2004. In Europe, Beyers & Braun (2013) measure strong (weak) ties between IGs belonging to the same (different) political coalition to capture how IGs gain access to elected officials and bureaucrats. These recent studies suggest that the network position occupied by IG is a key variable to explain its activities and influence. The proposed paper builds upon these SNA studies; it goes one step further by analyzing simultaneously the (venue shopping) strategies of IGs in multiple venues (i.e. lobbying the government, lobbying the Parliament, litigation and direct democracy), in different policy domains (e.g. stem cells research, renewable energies, same-sex marriage, rail infrastructure, immigrants' rights) and over two decades in California. It addresses the following questions: Where (in which institutional venue?), how (with which intensity?) and with whom (joining a coalition?) do IGs try to influence policy-making? Do IGs that occupy a central network position within a venue have a greater influence on policy outputs? Are IGs situated at the intersection of several venues the most successful? The proposed paper is innovative for three reasons. First, IGs’ strategies are put into a concrete policy-making context. Second, the SNA encompasses all potential institutional venues, including direct democracy. Third, the comparative approach maximizes variations between IGs types and policy domains.
