In the recent period, several electoral contests seem to indicate that incumbent governments are facing strong difficulties to survive at the polls due to the economic crisis. This configuration has been particularly strong in countries most severely hit by the crisis like Greece, Ireland, Italy or Spain, but is also apparent in others (France, Denmark, Austria).
That government are more sanctioned in bad economic times is not a new observation. The economy is well established as an explanatory variable for incumbents’ punishment, especially in southern European countries.
However, how voters exactly express in the polls their discontent towards the governing parties may vary. Some opt for the main opposition party, others choose new parties. Those newcomers, usually linked with popular unrest, can be a real challenge for status quo parties. In this paper we want to explore how uncertain scenarios provoked by the rise of new parties in economic crisis can lead to electoral system change.
In particular, we expect to possible scenario. The first is that the main parties feeling threatened by the new challengers will opt for a maximin strategy, going for more proportionality. The alternative is to try to block the entry of new challengers by adding new barriers to entry (threshold, low DM). The crucial factors determining the choice between the two are the intensity of the economic crisis and the degree of electoral volatility (external and internal).
