Our proposal aims to explain the patterns of recruitment of the judiciary elite in Spain. This group includes the members of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. While the last one is the apex of the Spanish judiciary power, the former is a specific political court, outside the judiciary power, whose essential task is Constitutional review of laws and protection of fundamental rights. Both Courts are composed by a small amount of members. The twelve members of the Constitutional Court are appointed for a fixed-term of 9 years. Similarly, the members of the Supreme Court are appointed for life, although they use to resign at age 70 for retirement. Earlier resignations are extremely rare in both cases. There are around 74 members (this may change by act), distributed amongst the five chambers in which the Court is divided. In both Supreme and Constitutional Court, candidates do not have necessarily to be judges or members of lower Courts previously. They may also come from the university or the private. Consequently, the recruitment is a very relevant element that provides information on their background and the factors that have favoured their election as members of the institutions. As a first step for further research, our paper will aim to explain which factors explain the election of the members of botch Courts in a twofold analysis. First, we will observe the individual, political and professional background, in order to identify the main patterns of recruitment of these individuals. Second, we will employ event history analysis to explain which factors affect the probability of getting earlier or later to these institutions (depending on individual factors, on their political profile -in both cases they need party support to get promoted-, or on their recruitment path -they might be judges, academics or simply law experts).
