This paper will explore the response of Europe’s leading international financial centre, the City of London, to recent EU regulatory reforms. Using a comparative case study of the negotiation of the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), it analyses the City’s capacity for collective action in Brussels and disaggregates the lobbying dynamics through which it has sought to shape the EU’s evolving regulatory agenda. The paper draws upon the Varieties of Financial Capitalism framework, testing whether there is a distinctive ‘UK’ national financial interest. This involves analysing the process of national preference formation and projection in the UK, exploring the alignment or misalignment of government and industry preferences, and mapping the extent of lobbying coordination between industry and regulators. It aims to make an important contribution to our understanding of the political power of financial centres and the nature of the multi-level lobbying game through which they exert influence. This research forms part of an ESRC-funded study on Policy Networks and Regulatory Reform in the City of London (Ref: ES/K001019/1).