Climate geoengineering is a response to the anthropogenic climate changes that have resulted from increasing GHG emissions since the Industrial Revolution, and particularly, the 1950s. Geoengineering is commonly distinguished from the latter type of climate change in that it is avowedly intentional. Indeed, the intentional, or deliberate, nature of the modification is emphasised in most of the influential definitions of geoengineering and climate engineering. Intentions are commonly thought to be morally significant: for example, common-sense morality distinguishes between intentionally killing someone –the charge of murder- and accidental killing for which a charge of manslaughter is more appropriate. Some have suggested that intentional geoengineering-induced climate change is morally worse than causing climate change unintentionally by emitting greenhouse gases (Corner and Pidgeon 2010). This paper assesses three ways in which intentions might morally matter in the case of geoengineering. Firstly, the common sense view, that an agent’s intentions affect the permissibility of their actions, might be defensible. Secondly, following Thomas Scanlon (2008), intentions might not affect the permissibility of an action directly, but the significance of the act. I then consider whether the change in significance might go onto affect the permissibility of an action all things considered. Thirdly, I explore how intentions might matter when it comes to ascribing responsibility for the consequences, positive and negative, expected and unexpected, of using a geoengineering technique.
