Imagine two warriors. Give both a sword and let them fight. The winner will be the one who uses his sword most effectively with personal strength and experience. Now imagine the swords are constitutional competences. Give both warriors the same constitutional competences and let them fight. The winner will be the one who uses them most effectively with personal strength or experience. But a warrior without a sword cannot win - despite personality or experience.
I use this analogy to describe the relation of constitutional competences and presidential power. This concept of presidential power combines aspects of constitutional and actual responsibilities, of absolute and relative power and of individual behaviour. Considering this I am especially interested to find out if and to what extent it is possible to relate the constitutional power of presidents to the development of a certain constitutional reality?
Therefore I combine my new measurement of presidential power with the level of enforcement based on a model of absolute and relative power to conceptualize constitutional reality. With a factor analysis I developed 4 types of presidential institutions according to their level of competences in standard and exceptional situations. Selecting among these types with an emphasis on Eastern European countries I compare cases with similar constitutional prerequisites but an intriguing variation between absolute and relative power.
I examine what leverage this approach has by using data from the measurement in 46 countries. By this I disprove some of the “common wisdom” about the influence of direct election or the role of veto powers. I also provide evidence for not so established assumptions like the higher influence of standard competences on presidential power. And most importantly I present my version of the underlying structure of presidential power to enhance the discussion about regime types in a coherent direction.
