This paper examines the form and function of group representational schemes (GRS) for women and ethnic minorities worldwide. Conceptually, it advances two arguments. First, it revisits and elaborates on the differences between representational schemes for women and those for minorities. Second, it posits that governments may well adopt such schemes for strategic reasons related to power consolidation, rather than for the normative purpose of enhancing the status of marginalized groups. Empirically, the paper reviews the application of GRS worldwide, before narrowing the focus to 21 countries that have schemes for both women and minorities. It develops a typology to highlight patterns of implementation related to a) electoral and party systems; b) the territorial structure of ethnic groups; and c) levels of democracy. Three findings are emphasized. First, differences in the implementation of GRS are greater than is generally assumed, both between women and minorities, and among minorities. There is therefore little basis to support the general argument that there is a process of quota diffusion from women to ethnic minorities either within or across borders. Second, there is a significant degree of incompatibility between ethnic GRS and representational advances for women. Where ethic GRS exist, they more often have a negative effect on the representation of women; where measures exist for both ethnic groups and women, there is often a null effect for minority women. Finally, the relationship between ethnic GRS and democracy is more problematic than has been previously assumed. In particular, the design and implementation of representational schemes for ethnic groups is found to be predominantly shaped by the strategic interests of governing elites. Much of the impact of such measures thus depends on the particular configuration of rules employed, and on the nature of implementing regimes.
