There is a general understanding that judicial independence requires security of tenure and salaries and some measure of judicial self-administration. Those guarantees are generally secured through constitutional provisions or in quasi-constitutional legislation that outlines the structure and operation of courts.
While those basic assurances appear to give courts the necessary isolation from political influence to properly acquit their adjudicative and judicial review functions, there are other subtle influences on how a judicial career is shaped that may have consequences for the political impact of courts, for judicial behavior and for the make-up of a high court.
Formal and informal standards for appointment, retirement ages or pension entitlements, post retirement opportunities, and administrative norms on the court may all have an impact on the way that judges acquit their responsibilities, on the stability of a court and the opportunities for influence that political branches have through new appointments.
This paper uses the Supreme Court of Canada to illustrate the potential effect of judicial career influences on a high court. It will present summary data on patterns of Canadian high court judicial careers, pre-judicial careers and qualifications, and the existing incentives and disincentives faced by judges when making retirement plans. The paper will test existing theories of judicial careers, particularly those associated with the Supreme Court of the United States using the Canadian case. Career influences will be shown to be more of an influence on judicial turnover than on judicial behavior specifically, but that this still has important consequences for the way that the Supreme Court of Canada operates.
