This paper examines the extent to which political conditionality attached to development aid has been successful in leveraging liberal democratic reforms in autocratic contexts. Has such aid conditionality been effective, or alternatively have non-democratic regimes persisted or even been reinforced? The paper examines the aid policies of both the European Union and the US government. It places an emphasis on aid sanctions, but also examines positive conditionality, i.e. the provision of development assistance as leverage towards more democratic governance.
The findings of earlier research on political conditionality suggested that sanctions were a relatively ineffective tool with regard to democratic reform, although this was explained more by the weak and partial nature of the sanctions imposed than by the strength of the autocratic governments to resist the conditionality measures. Additionally, analysis of where aid sanctions had been implemented, and where they had not, revealed a pattern of selective and inconsistent application. (See Crawford 1997, for example).
How has political conditionality evolved subsequently, especially in the context of the new aid architecture and issues of ownership and partnership? What has been the impact of political conditionality on autocratic regimes? Has it been more successful in leveraging democratic reform or remained ineffective? If the latter, what explains this continued ineffectiveness? These questions are addressed by undertaking a review of EU and US policy and practice in the area of political conditionality from 2000 to date. The review is organised in two main sections. The first section is devoted to sanctions/suspensions of aid, while the second presents the insight from literature on the role of positive conditionality and engagement with autocratic regimes. The focus is on both EU and US aid conditionality, with a comparison of the policy and practice of these two major actors.
