Interest Groups and Legitimacy: Assessing the Contribution of Different Forms of Interest Aggregation to Democratic Governance

Abstract

When addressing the topic ‘interest groups and legitimacy’ usually the groups’ organization comes into focus: To what extent are interest groups accountable and participatory organizations? Legitimacy is said to rest on representation, participation, and, and to be nourished by solidarity and a common cause. Intra-organizational democracy is considered to be key for generating legitimacy, but it is not the only way. Also the appropriation of a hegemonial rhetoric or the empowerment by external actors can bolster the legitimacy of a group. The Panel invites papers that deepen our knowledge concerning the different ways and means which interest groups use to generate legitimacy. We also encourage the submission of papers that take a wider perspective take into account that the legitimacy claim of interest groups does not just concern the relationship with members but also their role in democratic governance. The question is how variations in the organization and aggregation of interests affect the legitimacy of interest group involvement in participatory governance. Strategies to strengthen a group’s legitimacy may increase biased representation and reinforce differentiation to such an extent that the reconciliation of interests in a democratic process becomes problematic. Whereas the issue of biased representation is high on the research agenda, the nexus of interest aggregation by interest groups and democratic governance is not. One way of looking at it is presented by Johan Olsen (2017). He argues that a key element of a well-functioning democracy is ‘(…) a willingness to compromise (…) to find what is tolerable, rather than finding an ideal society’ and that ‘politics must be created in a space where the participants have enough in common to talk about what is possible, what is necessary, and what is desirable’, then different forms of interest mobilization and aggregation matter. We assume that the willingness to compromise is greater when the individual interest group’s claim results from negotiations between contending views rather than from mobilizing selective interests and principled beliefs. Moreover, we assume that a compromise is achieved more easily in an environment that rewards alliance building. If this assumption is theoretically sound, it is worth exploring changes in the practise of organizing interests, particularly under the impact of digital technologies. Under what conditions do they favour an expansion of the plurality of divergent views, ease the forming of encompassing alliances, or split society into irreconcilable camps? Furthermore, we should know how certain procedures of participatory governance (such as the ECI) affect interest association and the ability to find common ground for talking.