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In person icon The Role of Individual Ministers in Policy-Making/Reform-Making

Comparative Politics
Executives
Coalition
P384
Hanna Bäck
Lunds Universitet

In person icon Building: Adam Smith, Floor: 7, Room: 717

Thursday 16:00 - 17:40 BST (04/09/2014)

Abstract

Rational partisan theory considers political parties as the central actors in the policy-making process and therefore associates changes in government partisan complexion with changes in public policy outputs. The link between parties’ preferences and policy outputs however ought to be different according to whether cabinet policy-making is subject to ministerial discretion or if line ministers are constrained by their prime minister, a coalition agreement or any of the cabinet parties who could veto a proposal. A focus on individual ministers and the institutional constraints (cabinet decision-making structures) they evolve in is warranted to answer the following crucial questions: how does portfolio allocation across parties and individuals affect public policy? Are partisan effects only expected for policies that are salient to the portfolio holder? Does individual minister background (expertise and experience) matter? What should we expect from non-partisan expert ministers? What the impact of reshuffles on policy-making and policy outputs?

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