Urban Machines: Patronage/Corruption at the Local Level

Abstract

Small constituencies, where reciprocal control and enforcement are easier, may induce both virtuous and vicious behaviours. Local constituencies, which prize their identity and protect themselves from outer competition, are particularly prone to extreme behaviours. ‘Vicious behaviour’, i.e. corruption and patronage, is likely if the constituency can, through its representatives, extract resources from the center by threatening secession, withdrawal of candidates from shaky majorities and other forms of blackmail. ‘Virtuous behaviour’ is likely if the constituency can and must rely on its own means. More generally, we expect a relatively high (and undetected) level of patronage/corruption at the local level, particularly in fields connected with the delivery of local services.

Title	Details
Builders, State Managers and Local Mayors: Interested Networks and the Governance of the Paris/Ile de France Region	View Paper Details
Personal Vote and Political Patronage in Italy	View Paper Details
Urban politics and patronage, a comparison between Naples and Marseille	View Paper Details