The European Union in international trade governance

Abstract

Although trade policy is one of the European Union’s (EU) most significant policy fields, its scientific analysis has to a remarkable extent been left to lawyers and economists. As a result, the interplay among the trade preferences of private actors and public authorities, the institutional setting in which trade policies are made, and policy outcomes has rarely been the subject of systematic debate and research. For this panel, we therefore invite contributors to investigate the following aspects of European trade governance. (1) How does decision-making in EU trade policy work? Do the decision rules of consensus and qualified majority cause deadlock? Or do they actually increase the EU’s bargaining power in international trade negotiations? (2) What are the political incentives of public actors making trade policy in the different institutions? What are the incentives for private actors’ lobbying efforts under the current institutional set-up? How might this have changed over time? Does a system of joint decision making restrict or enhance the power of pressure groups to influence policy outcomes? (3) How can current trade policy preferences and existing institutions explain the trade policies of the EU? Why was the EU so adamant in pushing for a comprehensive trade Round in the framework of the World Trade Organisation, whereas the US merely wanted sector specific negotiations? What explains the EU’s pursuit of reciprocal preferential trade agreements?

Title	Details
The EU's Internal Dynamics as Constraints and Opportunities for EU Entrepreneurship in the WTO	View Paper Details
Liberalizing European Trade: Collusion, Market Size, or Bargaining Power?	View Paper Details
The return of politics in EU trade-policy making?	View Paper Details
The EU's Pursuit of Non-Trade Goals in the WTO	View Paper Details