Menu
Menu
Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.
Just tap then “Add to Home Screen”
| Title | Details |
|---|---|
| Are agents able to control their principal’s control structures? An empirical investigation of parliamentary means to “keep an eye” on the executive | View Paper Details |
| Between Electorate and Executive: Parliament as Linchpin | View Paper Details |
| Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuff | View Paper Details |
| Delegating Legislative power in Italian Parliament | View Paper Details |
| DELEGATION IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES: HAS SMALLNESS A BIG EFFECT? An exploratory analysis for the case of Luxembourg | View Paper Details |
| Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western EuropeL A Cross-Sectional Comparison | View Paper Details |
| Explaining the origins of delegation: the case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France | View Paper Details |
| Independent Regulatory Agencies: control and capture | View Paper Details |
| Lasting Tensions in Research Policy-Making – A Delegation Problem | View Paper Details |
| Legitimation of Delegation to Independent Non-Majoritarian Institutions and Its Consequences for Contemporary Democracies | View Paper Details |
| Parliamentary Democracy as Delegation and Accountability | View Paper Details |
| Sloppy Hexagons and $1,000 Hammers: A Theory of Efficient Delegation | View Paper Details |
| Supranational Actors’ Preferences over Controlling a Supranational Institution | View Paper Details |
| Toward a content and contextual approach of delegation, or “how and why we should open the regulation black box” | View Paper Details |
| Veto Players and Political Control of Bureaucracy | View Paper Details |