Targeting the Political Collective: A New Framework to Explore Collective rule and Personalization in Authoritarian Regimes (Saudi Arabia as A Case Study)

In authoritarian studies, scholars frequently categorize regimes based on the nature of the ruling elite—typically distinguishing between one-party systems, military governments, and monarchies. According to this conventional typology, these ruling groups are conceptualized as homogeneous political entities possessing inherent cohesion, such as a professionalized military or a disciplined party. However, in practice, the composition of the ruling coalition is often profoundly heterogeneous. Research that treats the political collective as a monolithic group risks losing analytical credibility, as it tends to downplay the complexity of authoritarian governance and overlook the internal diversity of the ruling elite. Consequently, such typologies fail to fully capture the intricate dynamics of collective oligarchical rule and the subsequent process of personalization within these regimes. The aforementioned typology categorizes ruling elites through the lens of modern institutions and formal political organizations. Nevertheless, Weberian perspectives suggest that even under traditional patrimonialism, the leader’s authority was never absolute; rather, it was constrained by informal conventions and religious doctrines internalized by the collective, which served to curb arbitrary personal will. Building on this, this paper proposes a novel analytical framework to scrutinize the authoritarian collective along two primary dimensions: the modern-traditional dichotomy and the interplay between formal and informal norms. It will use Saudi Arabia as a paradigmatic case to illustrate the diversity and volatility inherent in such norms. The evolving nature of the ruling coalition provides the essential foundation for analyzing the regime’s transition from consensual collective rule to centralized personal rule. In Saudi Arabia, modern formal entities encompass established institutions such as the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, alongside cohesive state apparatuses like the Armed Forces and the National Guard. Conversely, the traditional formal collective includes institutions like the Allegiance Council and the Council of Senior Ulama, as well as socio-political bodies such as the royal clans within the House of Saud and the Wahhabi religious elite. Furthermore, political stability in the Kingdom is underpinned by a constellation of informal norms, specifically elite-level consensuses. These include established protocols for royal succession, the regime’s ideological commitment to Wahhabi legitimacy, and the mechanisms governing the distribution of oil revenues. These diverse manifestations of the political collective provide the analytical foundation for understanding the dynamic fluctuations between oligarchical collective rule and personalized politics. Under its founder, King Ibn Saud, the regime was profoundly personalist. Following his demise, the regime transitioned toward a dynastic monarchy defined by collective rule among princes, a structure further solidified by "Faysal’s Order" in 1964. This long-standing family consensus, however, was abruptly dismantled beginning in 2017. King Salman fundamentally altered the succession line to favor his son, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), thereby disrupting established norms of family consensus. Subsequently, MBS has systematically distanced the monarchy from its traditional reliance on the Wahhabi ulama, opting instead to derive legitimacy through an ambitious agenda of social liberalization and economic privatization.