What is the Value of Impartial Expertise? An Integrity Approach

The idea that democracy requires research-based expertise to be value-free or neutral has long been met with skepticism. While this skepticism is warranted, there is little recognition that the epistemic authority of expertise still depends on impartiality, and that impartiality is distinct from neutrality. This conceptual conflation creates downstream problems, for example by undermining the distinction between taking social responsibility and engaging in illegitimate activism. This article explains why the impartiality of expertise should be conceived as a constraint governed by value-based considerations grounded in integrity rather than neutrality. While experts should not take part in ordinary politics qua experts, they may nevertheless have to take a stand in evaluative disputes. The paper suggests possible value-based sources of impartial normativity—discipline-based codes of ethics, research ethics, and precedents of practice—which can steer expert evaluations away from private opinion without the pretense of neutrality.