Beyond Conditionality: Strategic Compliance and the EU's Struggle to Promote Rule of Law in the Western Balkans

In spite of prolonged EU efforts to promote rule of law in the Western Balkans, progress has been slow and uneven. While Europeanisation theories suggest that sustained EU engagement drives rule of law progress, organised hypocrisy and selectorate theory offer alternative expectations regarding the limitations of EU conditionality. Drawing on these frameworks, the study develops the concept of strategic compliance, whereby domestic leaderships superficially implement EU-mandated reforms to maintain access to external incentives while keeping intact domestic patronage networks. In its turn, the EU tolerates incomplete implementation of EU rules to showcase the effectiveness of EU conditionality. The study examines the extent of the application of the concept of strategic compliance through the case study of Albania’s rule of law reforms, and in particular, the establishment of the Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) and the judicial vetting process, two crucial reforms as part of the country´s EU accession process. The analysis is based on primary and secondary sources in the form of in-depth semi-structured interviews with influential Albanian and EU actors from civil society, think tanks, media, and politics, as well as EU and international reports, and relevant academic literature. The findings highlight how strategic compliance shapes reform outcomes, exposing the limits of EU conditionality in promoting rule of law in Albania. These insights contribute to a broader understanding of the EU’s evolving approach to enlargement and rule of law promotion across the Western Balkans and possibly beyond.