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Loyalty, Productivity and Service: Legislative Candidate Selection in Ghana

Africa
Comparative Politics
Elections
Elites
Parliaments
Political Competition
Political Parties
Candidate
Martin Acheampong
German Institute for Global And Area Studies
Martin Acheampong
German Institute for Global And Area Studies

Abstract

The behavioural consequence of different candidate selection mechanisms has been widely documented. However, little attention has been paid to variations in constituency-specific nomination strategies adopted by parties operating under the same selection rules, and their consequence on post- election legislative behaviour. I argue that regardless of the mechanism of candidate selection, constituency parties apply different restrictive and permissive candidacy benchmarks for electorally safe and vulnerable constituencies respectively. In constituencies where the threat of defeat is low, parties confine candidacy to highly loyal members. Conversely, selection in swing constituencies tends to be more inclusive. Additionally, restricting candidacy induces post-election parliamentary focus while opening up intra- party competitions engenders constituency focus. I analyse these claims in the Ghanaian context using the New Patriotic Party's (NPP) 2020 parliamentary candidate selection. I draw on a range of empirical evidence including interviews and press data. The analysis demonstrates that, in the NPP’s safe constituencies, candidacy was restricted to loyal members, who consequently exhibit minimal constituency effort. On the other hand, MPs who focus less on plenary activities but more on the constituency went through permissive selection procedures in swing constituencies.