Exploring Populist Communication on Central Bank in the Case of the Czech Republic

In rise to power, populist actors are highly critical of the current establishment and state institutions. Besides parliament and other pillars of liberal democracy, the populist critique and delegitimation appeals also tends to be aimed at independent institutions such as the central banks. While some scholars associate the populist approach to the economy with specific occurrences, such as politics of redistribution and disregard for public finance deficits, recent research shows that the relationship is more complex ranging from redistributive (redistributive such as the Law and Justice in Poland) to neoliberal/libertarian (e.g. the new president of Argentina Javier Milei) approaches. This analytical ambiguity necessitates further research. We argue that the stances taken by populist actors vary depending on their roles within the state executive. Based on theoretical arguments, we examine the communication of populist actors towards central banking and its exclusive instruments (e.g. currency stability), focusing on the Czech party ANO led by former entrepreneur Andrej Babiš. The analysis follows ANO's evolution from a junior government partner holding the Ministry of Finance (2013-2017) thru senior partner in minority government (2017-2021) to today’s opposition role (2021-). Using sentiment analysis of parliamentary speeches by ANO MPSs between 2013 and 2023, the empirical section follows ANO’s communication about the Czech National Bank (CNB) and contextualizes it qualitatively with the change of party’s strategy over time. The study contributes to understanding how populists communicate about economic matters across various power positions and confront these findings with the established notions of discourses embraced by populist actors.