Schadenfreude Representation

By excavating insights from recent research on negative partisanship, I identify a previously unrecognized and undertheorized mode of representation, what I call Schadenfreude Representation. This mode of representation occurs when a group feels better represented when their representative’s actions inflicts harm on an out-group as opposed to improving the well-being of an in-group. Instead of understanding representation as occurring when representatives advance the "self-referential" preferences of the represented, ones that privilege improving the emotional and physical well-being of the represented’s in-group, schadenfreude representation occurs when constituents feel represented when their political opponents become upset and harmed by the actions of their representatives. This alternative mode of representation recognizes that citizens can derive political benefits from the suffering of their fellow citizens and can even experience such suffering as a form of political entertainment. To the extent that individuals are willing to sacrifice and pay for entertainment, e.g. the cost of a concert ticket, they may be willing to suffer some, if they are properly entertained and the result is sufficiently pleasurable. This capacity to enjoy and take pleasure in the suffering of others means some forms of representation can incentivize satisfying a majority’s preferences for their fellow citizens doing worse off. Recognizing the changing nature of what is being represented is crucial for identifying how the morality of democratic legitimacy can also change. My discussion of schadenfreude representation proceeds in four steps. I begin by explicating my understanding of symbolic representation and how it differs from traditional approaches to symbolic representation dating back to Hanna Pitkin. I do so because I understand schadenfreude representation as a form of symbolic representation. In the case of schadenfreude representation, it is not how the representative’s actions impact a constituent (or their people) that produces a sense of being represented; rather, it is how the representative’s "other-regarding" actions make the constituent feel represented! Next I turn to the literature on negative partisanship in contemporary politics to differentiate it from schadenfreude representation. In particular, I draw on Liliana Mason and Monroe’s work on Lethal Mass partisanship to justify my assumption that some forms of negative partisanship can produces citizens who are not only callous towards but even "enjoy" the suffering of their partisan opponents. With this information, it is easier to justify why political scientists and theorists should not assume citizens only evaluate their representatives by what they do for and say about their people. This leads to my discussion of two features of schadenfreude representation in Section 3. Finally, I conclude in Section 4 by identifying one way that schadenfreude representation calls to question the normative legitimacy of democratic representative institutions.