Putin's Third Term (2012-2018): Is it a Russian Imperial Declaration?

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were a crisis and an opportunity for the Russian Federation. It experienced an identity crisis, as before in its history, during the term of Peter the Great and the beginning of the term of the Soviet Union. The crisis was from the inside of the Russian Federation, and the resolution of the identity crisis on foreign policy manifested itself in the current neo-Eurasian tendencies. Furthermore, it had an opportunity to fill the power vacuum of the ex-Soviet geography. This opportunity was from outside the Russian Federation, and it was utilized via the offensive realist foreign policy maneuvers of Russia. Especially after the 2007 Munich Security Conference speech of Vladimir Putin, the President has implemented some policies that can be considered neo-Eurasianist and offensive realist. These policies were able to be visible during the third term of Putin. From this point of view, this study will demonstrate the examples of the neo-Eurasianist and offensive realist tendencies in Putin’s third term. At the same time, with this study, the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 will be revealed and understood. The research question of this study is whether Putin’s third term can be evaluated as a Russian imperial declaration. In this direction, the study argues that Putin’s third term can be considered a Russian imperial declaration by using four cases that belong to the different areas; one speech, one annexation, one phenomenon, and one concept paper: the Valdai Speech of Vladimir Putin in 2013, Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the idea of Eurasian Union and the Foreign Policy Concept Paper of the Russian Federation in 2016. In this study, three methods will be melted in the same pot. Firstly, the process-tracing method will be used to comprehend the Russian foreign policy between 2012-2018 in the context of neo-Eurasianism and offensive realism. Secondly, the content and qualitative discourse analysis will be utilized by examining the Valdai Speech in 2013 and the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept Paper to demonstrate the neo-Eurasianist and offensive realist tendencies of the Russian Federation. Lastly, four cases will be used within the context of the case study method.