The transnational governance of sovereign debt management

Since the late 1980s, due to increasing levels of outstanding debt, developed and developing countries have been undergoing an extensive overhaul in the management of government debt. Introducing reforms leading to the agencification and marketization of such dimension of statecraft, the state has been respectively enhancing its credibility towards global capital markets, and its efficiency in accessing funding. Targeting such policy domains, the wave of reforms is hence set in the broader phenomenon of state’s financialization. Stemming from such socio-economic developments, this article identifies the actors designing and steering the process of modernization of government debt management. Although scholars have focused on the implementation of reforms at the national level, the literature lacks of systematic analyses describing how transnational standards shaping modern public finance emerge. Filling such gap, this study provides an account of the actors, at the micro and macro level, formulating and advocating the implementation of government debt management best practices in national jurisdictions. Methodologically, the article draws on case studies, professionals’ career data, and social network analysis aiming at identifying the most influential actors in the policy cycle, and how these carry out effective advocacy. At the macro level, the study depicts a transnational network of multilateral financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank), international think tanks (e.g., the OECD), and private consultancies steering the state towards greater compliance with the principle of ‘market discipline’. By the same token, the micro level analysis detects a global epistemic community guiding the government through the effective implementation of reforms. The study contributes to the literature in the political economy of sovereign debt management, and, inductively, in transnational governance, by providing a case study on how global policy communities transfer technocratic recommendations across jurisdictions. Additionally, showing how international actors turn government debt management into a transnational policy domain, the study discusses the potential implications for democratic accountability.