Limits of European Governance in “potentially violent” settings under contestation: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In July 2020, the EU commemorated the 25th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica. In a statement by Charles Michel, Ursula von der Leyen and Josep Borrell, they called it one of the darkest chapters of modern European history and urged for reconciliation. The statement envisioned a European future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggested a clear role for EU governance in this post-conflict situation to mitigate between the conflicting (and often violent) narratives, which are still prevalent. This paper takes a critical approach towards how EU governance tackles potentially violent settings and asks whether the European toolbox of “Europeanization” by conditionality and incentives is counterproductive for environments where political and ethnic tension is high, civic identity underdeveloped, distrust and hatred easily mobilised and common goals difficult to identify. More specifically, the question has to be raised, whether EU governance tools themselves are a source of conflict, resistance and contestation and thus contribute to the tensions instead of becoming mechanisms for resilient peace-building. The hypothesis is that the European “post-liberal” governance approach of de-politicisation (focused on technical administrative procedures rather than the representative legitimacy of policy making) hinders the reconstruction of the Bosnian society around a shared future-oriented perspective and prevents the building of genuine state institutions representing the multitudes of social interests. It therefore reproduces the conflicts it aims to overcome. This limits EU’s capacities as a mediator in conflict and weakens its standing in a crucial region, opening the field for contestation by other (external) actors who – like Russia in particular - take advantage of these dynamics and present themselves as strategic partners, seemingly caring more about the region’s interest than the EU. This heightens the danger of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming another “torn” state at the European “frontlines”.