Coherent or incoherent? Italian sovereignist parties in front of supranational crisis management

Since the 2018 political elections, three large populist and Eurosceptic parties sit in the Italian parliament: the League (“Lega”), the Five Star Movement (“Movimento 5 Stelle”) and Brothers of Italy (“Fratelli d’Italia”). The first two also took part in government, whereas the third one has never done so. League and Five Star Movement both supported the first cabinet led by Prime minister Giuseppe Conte (Conte I). Together with the Democratic Party, the Five Star Movement was also part of the Conte II cabinet, whereas the League moved to opposition. The political manifestos of the three parties for the 2018 elections included strong Eurosceptic positions, including the option of leaving the EU (“Italexit”). This paper traces back the positions of Italian populist parties on a specific policy (fiscal and budgetary) and on the polity level more generally, i.e. the stance on the future of EU integration (constitutional democratic visions). By doing so, it focuses on the nature as well as on the evolution of populist positions. On the former, we are particularly interested in inquiring whether those parties only oppose the current state of the EU or whether they also propose an alternative. Regarding the latter, the paper aims to see how positions of Italian populist parties changed when moving from government to opposition. Specifically, we highlight the stance of those parties on the fiscal measures the EU adopted to face the Covid-19 pandemic – with particular reference to Recovery Fund/Next Generation EU – and on the post-pandemic future of the EU. The paper systematically investigates parties’ positions by running a qualitative text analysis (supported by MAXQDA) of manifestos and parliamentary speeches. It allows to shed light on Italian Euroscepticism from several points of view. Firstly, which positions Eurosceptic parties expressed. Secondly, how such positions differ between the parties considered and how consistent they are when moving from polity to policy visions. Thirdly, how such positions changed over time and which factors could account for such change. Among such factors, we consider: the party’s role in the parliament (government vs opposition), its relationship with EU institutions (particularly the Commission) and its stance towards EU-level measures to face the Covid-19 pandemic. Ultimately, the paper assesses if over time the degree of Italian Euroscepticism has increased or decreased. By doing so, we will reach important findings also on the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism in Italy.