Not All Incumbents are Created Equal: Incumbency Advantage and Ruling Advantage in Czech Municipal Elections

Several authors found evidence supporting incumbency advantage. However, the majority of research has been conducted using data from countries using winner-takes-all electoral systems which cannot delineate between the effect of holding a seat (incumbency effect) and belonging to a ruling coalition (ruling effect), while the evidence from proportional representation systems provides mixed results. Using the data from the Czech municipal elections, I found that not all parties and candidates are advantaged in the same manner. In particular, the results of regression discontinuity design does not indicate any support for incumbency advantage in the Czech municipal elections. In contrast to that, the regression models indicate that both the probability of re-election and increased share of votes in the consecutive elections increases depending on the party‘s and candidates‘ position within the ruling coalition. On the individual level, the most beneficial positions are those of a mayor and deputy mayor which increase the probability of re-election, while the position of a member of the municipal board or regular municipal deputy does not affect the probability. In addition, the members of ruling coalitions are advantaged by controlling municipal newsletters that are usually distributed for free to the inhabitants of the municipality and thus the members of the ruling coalition benefits from higher media coverage. On the party level, belonging to the mayor‘s party increases the probability of vote gain in the consecutive election, but it is conditional on the mayor running in the consecutive election. The results, thus, indicate in the Czech case the incumbency advantage is driven primarily by the access to resources by the elected officials which is higher in the case of mayors and deputy mayors who are usually professional politicians, while the rest of elected deputies is not.