Proportionalism as the First Line of Defence

Democracy has come under stress across the globe. Scholars, think tanks, and journalists alike signal democratic deconsolidation in countries as varied as Brazil, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. A dearth of recent books tried to explain this democratic deconsolidation by focusing on political actors, such as citizens (whose democratic norms are supposedly eroding) and elites (whose short-term political strategies supposedly undermine democracy). We argue that these perspectives overlook a crucial condition. Countries where democracy is most clearly under threat are all countries where majoritarian elements in the electoral system bundled political power (a single or even qualified majority) in the hands of a single political minority. These majoritarian elements might take the shape of a Westminster system, presidentialism, a large electoral threshold, or a bonus to the winning party. Not all countries with majoritarian elements find their democratic institutions under threat, but majoritarianism makes democratic deconsolidation more likely. This paper aims to develop the theoretical underpinning for this empirical pattern. We develop a range of mechanisms that explain how majoritarianism and proportionalism function as important constraints on the incentives and resources of citizens (most notably: voters) and elites (most notably: incumbents). This theoretical framework suggests that majoritarian elements in the electoral system primarily affect political elites, making incumbents more willing and more able to bend the democratic rules of the game to their will. Moreover, for the very same reasons why majoritarianism constrains incumbents’ incentives and resources, majoritarian elements are unlikely to be reformed. Finally, we engage with the paradox of societal discontent, extremism, and populism. Discontented, extreme, and populist voters are more likely to find parliamentary representation in proportional systems such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Yet, precisely because proportionalism is able to canalize these sentiments within the political system, it functions as a valve that prevents more daunting challenges. All in all, we conclude, proportionalism and power sharing function as an important bulwark against deconsolidation in a militant or resilient democracy.