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The Failure of Post-Conflict Peace Regime in Mozambique: The Conflict Resurgence in Times of Multi-Party Politics (1994-2013)

Africa
Conflict Resolution
Political Parties
Political Violence
Developing World Politics
Peace
State Power
Manuel Barroso Sevillano
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Manuel Barroso Sevillano
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Abstract

In 1992 -through the General Peace Agreements- Mozambique ended with 16 years of violence and armed conflict and, with the transition to a multiparty democracy system, a new political period began in the country. In 2013 after a two-decade of “success story” in peacekeeping, high levels of sustained economic growth, and multiple electoral processes experienced, a political-military crisis emerged. As a consequence of this, "low intensity” armed clashes have been developing in certain provinces of the north-central part of the country between the State security forces (under FRELIMO government) and the armed men of the main political party of the Opposition, RENAMO. The present article aims to analyze, through the categories of Political Science and the Peace and Conflicts Studies, the sociopolitical dynamics of the “Postwar Peace Regime” in Mozambique (1994-2014). It is, therefore, intended to increase the knowledge of the socio-political and economic dynamics underlying the "Post-War Peace Regime" built in Mozambique in the early 1990s - within the international agenda of The Liberal Peace -, its evolution in recent decades and its entry into crisis in 2013. A model of Peace that has been characterized by a rapid political and economic transition: from a "Marxist-Leninist" orientated single-party system of to a liberal-representative democracy and from a planned economy system to a capitalist and neoliberal one. Likewise it is also a historical period in which the presence of the international development cooperation agencies and International Financial Institutions has been important stakeholders in influencing the domestic political agenda as well as in the process of strategic reorientation of the State. These International Organizations -after having destined voluminous material contributions to the Peacebuilding process and later in the fight against poverty - have had no doubts in describing the Mozambican case as a "success story" both in the maintenance of peace, the democratic transition and in terms of economic growth in the last two decades. This article suggests the hypothesis that the privileged construction of a very specific narrative and image of a “successful Peace and democracy” in Mozambique -articulated from the national political elites and reinforced by the International Institutions- have limited the real options of criticism and the search for political alternatives. A Peace that, even if it has been real for the majority of Mozambican society through the absence of direct physical violence, had benefited especially to some population close to the ruling political party. A model Peace that chose for amnesia and forgetfulness, leaving in the background issues such as reconciliation and social justice. All this at the expense of making invisible historical grievances and other social realities affected by structural violence. A number of unresolved issues which may be fundamental - in the medium and long term – for a sustainable peace, as well as in the collective process of overcoming the traumas of a deep-rooted conflict in the Mozambican Society.