Whose Game are We Playing? Institutions and Local Service Delivery Choices (II)

Abstract

Douglass North defined institutions, the rule of game, as any form of constraint that humans devise to shape human interaction, namely political interactions. In this sense, both formal institutions (i.e. laws and rules) and informal institutions (i.e. norms, guidelines, or codes of conduct) purposely devised, either through deliberate choice or incremental change, to serve the political interests of political decision makers or coalitions in power. This panel seeks to explore both theoretically and empirically how institutional variation influences service delivery choices by local decision-makers.

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