How mini-publics deal with the challenge of elite manipulation: comparing two models in Belgium

Research has shown that mini-publics can be vehicles of qualitative deliberation among ordinary citizens. However, as mini-publics become more institutionalized and connected to power, they are becoming increasingly vulnerable to elite manipulation, which undermines their democratic potential. The tension arises from the fact that the features of mini-publics that promote qualitative deliberation, such as expert testimony, skilled facilitators, and balanced information, also make them susceptible to elite capture. All of these provide potential channels for powerful interest groups and other political actors attempting to manipulate the deliberative process. This paper investigates how institutionalized mini-publics attempt to resist elite manipulation by comparing two cases of institutionalized mini-publics: The Permanent Citizens’ Dialogue in the German-speaking Community of Belgium and the Deliberative committees in the Brussels’ parliament. The former is monitored by a permanent secretary and a council of citizens, while the latter is overseen by politicians and experts. Hence, the cases provide insights in how different models of institutionalization deal with elite manipulation. The cases are analyzed through a theoretical framework considering elite capture occurring before deliberations take place such as during the setting of the agenda and other preparations before the mini-public, during the deliberative process in which the role of practitioners and experts, and after the process such ashow the mini-publics’ recommendations are drafted and represented in other venues. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders and document analysis the results of this paper will show how both cases attempt to resist elite manipulation and what challenges they face in doing so.