This proposed paper seeks to conduct a comparative study of the growing influences of rapporteurs in the European Parliament on regulations regarding surveillance. There are three main objectives. First, this proposal aims to shed light on the linkage between individual interests and roles of rapporteurs in specific EP committees such INTA, DROI, SEDE, and JURI. To this end, the author will consider whether and to what extent the truncated policy of (circumscribed political power) of European Parliament is constrained or complemented by each rapporteur’s championing of constitutional liberal-democratic principles and fundamental rights. Second, endorsing the view that public policy is largely a social construct, which reflects top-down expert knowledge and bottom-up political necessities, the bulk of this paper aims to give in-depth, case-by-case analyses of the major surveillance proposals. To considerable extent, this project will trace out the processes by which European Parliament policies toward surveillance had come into existence in the past and may yet emerge in the future through the ways and means of, notably, emulation, policy transfer, lesson-drawing, and compliance with international treaties. Third, and finally, having shined light on the political nature and the technocratic dimensions of process-formation, this project will conclude by making a model of rapporteur’s activity, as managerial, entrepreneurial, and norm-setting. This will allow to trace individual preferences and role of this institution as crucial for final legislation.
